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trust is created which those who take the estate are bound to perform and
in case of breach, equity will step in and compel performance. The estate
is preserved and devoted to the use prescribed by the devisor and his heirs
can not resume it.8
There is little doubt that presumptions are adverse to the defeasance of
estates and doubts will be construed against such restrictions as might so
operate, 9 however, where the intention of the grantor is clear and the words
used fairly express his intention to create a condition the courts will give
effect to the condition.' 0
Nevertheless, it appears that most courts are strongly inclined to con-
strue devises to religious societies, specifying the use to which the estate is
to be devoted as devises in trust."1
Once the land is given to the trustees of a church it is not subject to a
reversionary interest in the heirs of the grantor nor in the grantor him-
self.12 The theory is that there is title coupled with a trust.13 In case of a
palpable breach of trust equitable aid may be invoked by some one leav-
ing an interest in the specific carrying out of the trust to compel its exe-
cution by the devisee.14
Thus it appears "where the language of the clause in the deed indicates
the simple purpose to define and regulate the use which shall be made of
real granted, and where it doesn't appear the use is for the special benefit
of the grantor and his heirs, it will not be construed as a condition sub-
sequent."'3 E. L. L.
TEACHERS' TENURE LAw-CoNsTiTuTioNALiTY-POwER To DISMISS PER-
MANENT TEACHERs--The plaintiff, a school teacher, had been employed by
the defendant school city for more than five years prior to May 5, 1930. On
that date he entered into a new contract, under which he served until July
24, 1931, at which time he was discharged as a result of a hearing held by
the defendant in which it was found that he had been guilty of insubordina-
tion in refusing to obey a reasonable regulation of the defendant-that is,
that all teachers should retire when they attained the age of seventy. The
8Stanley v. Colt (1867), 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502.
9 Summer v. Darnell (1870), 128 Ind. 38, 27 N. E. 162; Sherman v. Town of Jef-
ferson (1916), 274 Ill. 294, 113 N. E. 624; Sellers Chapel M. E. Church's Petition
(1891), 139 Pa. 61, 21 At]. 145.
10 Sheets v. Vandalia Ry. Co. (1920), 74 Ind. App. 597, 127 N. E. 609; Van Horn
v. Mercer (1902), 29 Ind. App. 277, 64 N. E. 531.
UStanley v. Colt (1867), 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502; Schier v. Trinity Church
(1871), 109 Mass. 1; Downer v. Rayburn (1905), (Ill.), 73 N. E. 364; First Presby.
Churchv . Bailey (1916), 97 Atl. 583; 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509, note.
"Bailey v. Wells (1891), 82 Iowa 131, 47 N. W. 988; Strong v. Doty (1873),
32 Wis. 381; Packard v. Ames (1860), 16 Gray (Mass.) 327.
13Mill; v. Davison (1896), 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 L. R. A. 113, 35 Atl. 1072; Wat-
terson v. Ury (1894), 5 Ohio C. C. 347, Affirm. 52 Ohio St. 637, 44 N. E. 1149;
Sohipper v. St. Palais (1871), 37 Ind. 505.
14 Strong v. Doty (1873), 32 Wis. 381; Baldwin v. Atwood (1854), 23 Conn. 367;
Rawson v. Uxbridge (1863), 7 Allen 125, 83 Am. Dec. 670.
15Hutchinson v. Ulrigh (1893), 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556; Farnham v. Thomp-
son (1885), 34 Minn. 330, 26 N. W. 9; Rawson v. Uxbridge (1863), 32 Wis. 381;
Sohier v. Trinity Church (1871), 109 Mass. 1; Neely v. Hockins (1892), 84 Me. 386,
24 AtI. 882; Episcopal City Mission v. Appelton (1875), 117 Mass. 326; Adams v.
First Baptist Church (1907), 148 Mich. 140, 111 N. W. 757.
RECENT CASE NOTES
plaintiff had reached that age in April, 1930. An Indiana statutel makes
all teachers, who enter into a new contract after they have served for a
school corporation for five or more successive years, permanent teachers.
Such a contract is deemed to continue in effect for an indefinite period, and
will remain in force until succeeded by a new one or until cancelled by the
corporation for incompetency, insubordination (which is defined as a wilful
refusal to obey the school laws of the state or the reasonable rules pre-
scribed for the government of the schools of such corporation), neglect of
duty, immorality, justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions,
or other "good and just cause." The statute further provides that the deci-
sion of the school board shall be final. The plaintiff brought this action to
have the resolution of the board vacated and to recover salary he alleged is
due him for the first month of the school year beginning in September, 1931.
From an order of the court overruling a demurrer to the complaint for in-
sufficient facts, the defendant appeals. Held, affirmed.2
The first question which logically presents itself is whether or not this
statute is unconstitutional in that it forces the local school organizations
to enter into a particular type of contract. An analysis of the problem will
immediately show, however, that this must be answered in the negative.
A local school organization is only an instrumentality or agent of the state,3
and so it cannot have any immunities from the power of the state to force
it into any contractual relationship.
A more difficult question concerns the jurisdiction of the court, in the
light of the express provision that the decision of the school board shall
be final. It will be seen that the question of whether the plaintiff was guilty
of insubordination depends upon whether the rule he disobeyed was a rea-
sonable one. The question of whether a rule laid down by school authori-
ties is reasonable is one of law.4 Due process of law requires that ques-
tions of law shall be decided by a judicial tribunal. Therefore, if the stat-
ute were construed to make the decision of the school board unreviewable,
it would contravene the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The result reached by the court upon this point is, then, un-
doubtedly correct.
In deciding the principal case the court held that there was no insub-
ordination as defined by the statute, because the rule which the plaintiff
disobeyed was not a reasonable one. The correctness of this result might
well be doubted. There is unquestionably an age limit beyond which the
teaching efficiency of the average person would be reduced. It might well
be argued that that age limit is not beyond seventy.
The opinion does not disclose whether the rule in question was estab-
lished before or after the plaintiff's contract became effective. If it was es-
tablished before the contract was entered into, the court was obviously
correct in making the result turn upon the reasonableness of the rule
which the plaintiff disobeyed. But, if the rule was made subsequently to
Sec. 6967, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1929.
2 School City of Evansville v. Culver, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 27, 1932,
182 N. E. 270.3 Ager v. Pagin (1906), 39 Ind. App. 567, 79 N. E. 379; Ehle v. State (1921).
191 Ind. 502, 133 N. E. 748; School Town of Windfall v. Somerville (1914), 181
Ind. 463, 104 N. E. 859.
'Fertich V. Michener (1887), 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605, 14 N. E. 68.
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the formation of the contract, would the provision in the United States
Constitution prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts
apply, and prevent the discharge of the plaintiff for the failure to obey the
rule, even though it was reasonable? In dealing with this question it is
convenient to first consider the power of the state. Could it pass a regula-
tion of the nature of the one under consideration, so that it would affect
contracts already in existence? It is not disputed that there was a valid
contract between the plaintiff and the school city. By its terms, it was to
continue in effect until superceded by a new one or until discharged as pro-
vided by the statute. Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution
forbids any state to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Un-
der this provision such legislation would be unconstitutional as impairing
the obligation of contracts, unless it was within the scope of the police
power.5 The extent of the police power depends upon the balance of social
iliterests. The legislature has the power to enact laws, even though they
would otherwise impair the obligation of contracts, where the social inter-
ests in favor of such legislation outweigh those against it. Obviously the
legislature would not have the power to abolish these contracts as a purely
arbitrary measure with no good reason. But, would it have the power to
enact a rule that they should be terminated upon the arrival of a teacher
at the age of seventy? Just how do the social interests balance? Upon the
one side we have the social interests in the freedom of contract and in the
individual life. Upon the other there are the social interests in the schools
themselves and in the general welfare of the people. If the rule under dis-
cussion is one reasonably necessary for the advancement of the schools,
it could scarcely be contended that the last named social interests would not
outweigh the others. In that case the rule would clearly be within the scope
of the police power. In other words, if it is a fact that people over seventy
are, as a general thing, too old to teach well, the rule that they must retire
at that age would be within the scope of the legislature's police power, and
could affect previously formed contracts without violating the Constitution.
In the principal case the court held, however, that such a regulation is un-
reasonable. This is conclusive as to the question of police power, unless
the Supreme Court were to decide otherwise as to the reasonableness of
the rule.
But could the defendant school city exercise the police power so that the
plaintiff could be discharged for refusing to obey one of its rules established
after the formation of his contract? In general, the acts of administrative
boards or officers are not "laws" within the meaning of the Constitution.6
However, they may be "laws" if they are of a legislative character and are
an exercise of delegated power.7 Local school organizations have, of course,
the power to make all regulations necessary to the proper conduct of their
schools, where such regulations are not inconsistent with the school law.
New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Co. (1885), 115 U. S. 650, 6
Sup. Ct. 252; New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. New Orleans Drainage Comm. (1904),
197 U. S. 453, 25 Sup. Ct. 471; Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup.
Ct. 127.
New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Co. (1887), 125 U. S. 15,
8 Sup. Ct. 741.
TGrand Trunk 1. 1. v. Indiana R. 1. Comm. (1910), 221 U. S. 400, 31 Sup.
Ct. 537.
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The statute under consideration itself, by implication, delegates this power.
It will be seen, then, that such a rule laid down by a school corporation is a
"law" within the meaning of the Constitution, for it is legislative in char-
acter and is an exercise of delegated power. Therefore, it would be uncon-
stitutional as to existing contracts, as an impairment upon the obligation of
contracts, unless the corporation had the power to exercise police power.
The legislature has the power to delegate police power to administrative
boards and units.8 The statute under consideration itself, by implication,
delegates the power to prescribe reasonable rules for the regulation of
school affairs. Since this is in no way limited, it ought to be construed as
giving to the school corporation the power to make all reasonable rules
that the state itself could make. So construed, there is such a delegation
of the police power that the school corporation could pass a rule within the
scope of such power, even though it would otherwise impair the obligation
of contracts. Under the statute the school authorities could, of course, dis-
charge any teacher who wilfully refused to obey such a rule.
Of course the result reached in the principal case is correct, assuming
that the court was not in error in holding that the rule involved was not a
reasonable one. The defendant could not possibly base its right to dismiss
the plaintiff upon any other cause than "insubordination." Where power
to dismiss for definite causes is expressly delegated to a school corporation,
it cannot dismiss for any other cause.9 It was not contended that the plain-
tiff was incompetent, immoral, that he neglected his duties, or that there
was a decrease in the number of teaching positions. It is true that the de-
fendant relied to some extent upon the application of the "or for other
good and just cause" provision. But, applying the doctrine of construction
known as ejusdem generis,o this really added nothing to the powers to dis-
miss expressly given by the statute. W. H. H.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-OCCUPATIONAL DIsEAsE-The depend-
ents of one, Buenker, were denied compensation, under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, where the evidence showed that the decedent had worked as
foreman of the employer's finishing room, where paint was used, and that
he died from metal poisoning as a result of an internal overdose of the
paint. Decedent had not been ill before and no wilfulness, nor expectation
of the poisoning, on the part of the decedent, was proven. Held, that the
death was the result of an "occupational disease" and not an "accident",
since no unusual occurrence on the day of the illness was proven.'
This decision brings into question the proper construction of our Act on
that phrase of the subject. The part of the Act applicable to this discussion
reads: 2 "Every employer and employee, except as herein stated, shall be
presumed to have accepted the provisions of this act respectively to pay
8 Woodruff v. R1. R. Co. (1890), 59 Conn. 63, 20 AtL 17; Relief Electric Light
Company's Petition (1916), 63 Pa. Super. 1; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. -. X. C.
Corp. Comm. (1906), 206 U. S. 1, 27 Su. Ct. 585.
9 School City of Elwooc v. The State ex rel. Griffin (Ind., 1932), 180 N.E. 471;
Kennedy v. San Francisco Bd. of Ed. (1890), 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042.
10 Yarlott V. Brown (1921), 192 Ind. 648, 138 N. E. 17.1 Buenker v. Union Furniture Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, June 2, 1932, 181
N. E. 294.
2Burns' Ann. St. Supp. of 1929, Sec. 9447.
